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EXCHANGEABLE CHOICE FUNCTIONS
ARTHUR VAN CAMP AND GERT DE COOMAN
ABSTRACT. We investigate how to model exchangeability with choice functions. Ex-
changeability is a structural assessment on a sequence of uncertain variables. We show
how such assessments constitute a special kind of indifference assessment, and how this
idea leads to a counterpart of de Finetti’s Representation Theorem, both in a finite and a
countable context.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study how to model exchangeability, a structural assessment for uncer-
tainty models that is important for inference purposes, in the framework of choice functions,
an interesting approach to modelling uncertainty. This work builds on earlier results by De
Cooman and Quaeghebeur [6], De Cooman et al. [7] for sets of desirable gambles.
Choice functions are related to the fundamental problem in decision theory: how to make
a choice from within a set of available options. In their book, von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [27] provide an axiomatisation of choice based on pairwise comparisons between
options. Later on, many authors [2, 15, 22] generalised this idea and proposed a theory of
choice functions based on choice between more than two elements. One of the aspects of
Rubin’s [15] theory is that, between any pair of options, the agent either prefers one of them
or is indifferent between them, so two options are never incomparable. However, the agent
may be undecided between two options without being indifferent between them; this will
for instance typically be the case when there is no relevant information available. This is
one of the motivations for a theory of imprecise probabilities [28], where incomparability
and indifference are distinguished. Kadane et al. [12] and Seidenfeld et al. [19] generalise
Rubin’s [15] axioms to allow for incomparability.
Exchangeability is a structural assessment on a sequence of uncertain variables. Loosely
speaking, making a judgement of exchangeability means that the order in which the vari-
ables are observed is considered irrelevant. This irrelevancy will be modelled through an
indifference assessment. The first detailed study of exchangeability was given by de Finetti
[8]; see Reference [9] for an overview of finite exchangeability for classical probability
theory. We refer to the paper by De Cooman and Quaeghebeur [6, Section 1] for a brief
historical overview.
In Section 2, we recall the necessary tools for modelling indifference with choice
functions. Next, in Section 4, we derive de Finetti-like Representation Theorems for a finite
sequence that is exchangeable. We take this one step further in Section 5, where we consider
a countable sequence and derive a representation theorem for such sequences. In order to
allow comparison with earlier work [6], we also provide representation theorems for sets of
desirable gambles.
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2. CHOICE FUNCTIONS, DESIRABILITY AND INDIFFERENCE
Consider a real vector space V , provided with the vector addition and scalar multiplication.
Elements u of V are intended as abstract representations of options amongst which a subject
can express his preferences, by specifying, as we will see below, choice functions. Often,
options are bounded real-valued maps on the possibility space, interpreted as uncertain
rewards, and therefore also called gambles. The set of all gambles on some domain X will
be denoted by L(X ). In this paper, we will rather focus on vector-valued gambles, because
earlier work by Zaffalon and Miranda [30] has already shown that this leads to an approach
to modelling uncertainty that is even more general than the typical imprecise probability
approach. Moreover, as we have discussed in some detail in [26, Section 3], the account of
coherent choice functions that Seidenfeld et al. [19] consider, can be embedded into our
framework, under some mild conditions. To focus the ideas, let X be an arbitrary possibility
space, andR be a finite set.1 With a vector-valued gamble f on X we mean an element of
the set L(X ×R) of gambles on the domain X ×R: indeed, for every x in X , the partial
map f (x,⋅) is a vector in R∣R∣. We will commonly refer to X as the ‘state part’ of the
domain, and to R as the ‘rewards part’. Of course, by letting ∣R∣ = 1, we retrieve the set
L(X ) of (real-valued) gambles.
However, we will define choice functions on general real vector spaces V rather than on
the more specific L(X ×R), because, as we will see later, we will need to define choice
functions on equivalence classes of gambles, which are no longer gambles themselves, but





λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R,uk ∈ A} ⊆ V





λkuk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R>0,uk ∈ A} ⊆ span(A),
where R>0 is the set of all (strictly) positive real numbers. Furthermore, for any λ in R>0
and u in V , we let λA+{v} ∶= {λu+v ∶ u ∈ A}. A subset A of V is called a convex cone if it
is closed under positive finite linear combinations, i.e. if posi(A) = A. A convex cone K is
called proper if K∩−K = {0}. With any proper convex cone K ⊆ V , we associate a vector
ordering ⪯K on V as follows: u ⪯K v⇔ v−u ∈K for any u and v in V . For any u and v in
V , we write u ≺K v if u ⪯K v and u ≠ v. We collect all the options u for which 0 ≺K u in V≻0.
When we work with vector-valued gambles, then V =L(X ×R) and the ordering will be
the standard one ≤, given by
f ≤ g⇔ (∀x ∈X ,r ∈R) f (x,r) ≤ g(x,r)⇔ (∀x ∈X ) f (x,⋅) ≤ g(x,⋅)
We collect the positive gambles—gambles f for which 0 < f —in L(X ×R)>0. Then ≤
corresponds to ⪯K where we let K ∶=L(X ×R)>0∪{0}.
We denote by Q(V) the set of all non-empty finite subsets of V . Elements of Q(V) are
the option sets amongst which a subject can choose his preferred options.
1Mostly, R is interpreted as a set of ‘rewards’, but it need not have an interpretation. We can allow for
countable R provided we then restrict ourselves to the linear space of those gambles f on X ×R for which
∑r∈R f (⋅,r) is real-valued and bounded—a gamble on X .
2This also allows us to connect our approach with the theory of coherent choice functions by Seidenfeld et al.
[19], where the authors define their choice function on horse lotteries instead of gambles.
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A choice function C on V is a map C∶Q→Q∪{∅}∶A↦C(A) such that C(A) ⊆ A. The
idea underlying this definition is that a choice function C selects the set C(A) of ‘best’
options in the option set A, or, on another interpretation, the ones that cannot be rejected.
Our definition resembles the one commonly used in the literature [1, 19, 21], except for a
restriction to finite option sets,3 which, then again, is also not altogether unusual [10, 16, 20].
Not every such map represents rational beliefs; only the coherent ones are considered to
do so.
Definition 1 (Coherent choice function). We call a choice function C on V coherent4 if for
all A, A1 and A2 in Q(V), u and v in V , and λ in R>0:
C1. C(A) ≠∅;
C2. if u ≺ v then u ∉C({u,v});
C3. a. if C(A2) ⊆ A2∖A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A then C(A) ⊆ A∖A1;
b. if C(A2) ⊆ A2∖A1 and A ⊆ A1 then C(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1;
C4. a. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then λA1 ⊆C(λA2);
b. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then A1+{u} ⊆C(A2+{u}).
It will sometimes be easier to use rejection functions instead of choice functions. A
rejection function R identifies from within every option set A, the options that are rejected,
or not chosen: R(A) ∶= A ∖C(A). Formally, a rejection function R on V is a map R∶Q→
Q∪{∅}∶A↦ R(A) such that R(A) ⊆ A. We can equivalently express the rationality axioms
in terms of rejection functions:
Definition 2 (Coherent rejection function). We call a rejection function R on V coherent if
for all A, A1 and A2 in Q, all u and v in V , and all λ in R>0:
R1. R(A) ≠ A;
R2. if u ≺ v then u ∈ R({u,v});
R3. a. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A then A1 ⊆ R(A);
b. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A ⊆ A1 then A1∖A ⊆ R(A2∖A);
R4. a. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) then λA1 ⊆ R(λA2);
b. if A1 ⊆ R(A2) then A1+{u} ⊆ R(A2+{u}).
Consider two isomorphic vector spaces V andW , a linear order isomorphism φ between
V andW , and a choice function C on V . Define the choice function C′ onW as u ∈C(A)⇔
φ(u) ∈C′(φ(A)) for all A in Q(V) and u in A. Then, because φ is a bijection, C satisfies
Axioms C1 and C3 if and only if C′ does; furthermore, because φ is order preserving,
C satisfies Axiom C2 if and only if C′ does; and finally, because φ is linear, C satisfies
Axiom C4 if and only if C′ does: such isomorphisms preserve coherence.
With any rejection function R, we let correspond a set of desirable options (or gambles)
DR = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∈ R({0,u})}. We can rewrite this in terms of the corresponding choice
function C, resulting in the same set of desirable options DC ∶= {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ∉C({0,u})} =DR .
A set of desirable options need not be derived from a choice function or a rejection function.
3The reason for our restriction to finite option sets is mainly a technical one: for instance the proof of
Proposition 19 relies on the finiteness of the option sets. We refer to [23] for more information about this.
4Our rationality axioms are based on those by Seidenfeld et al. [19], slightly modified for use with sets
of desirable options. Seidenfeld et al. [19] use horse lotteries as options, but, as mentioned before, by using
vector-valued gambles their account of coherent choice functions can be embedded into ours; see our earlier
work [26]. We would like to note here that Seidenfeld et al. [19] have a different definition of coherence: they call
a choice function coherent if it is represented through E-admissibility by some set of (finitely-additive) real-valued
probabilities and real-valued cardinal utilities. They introduce 4 axioms on choice functions that are equivalent
(Seidenfeld et al. [19, Theorems 3 and 4]) to coherence, under some mild conditions.
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It is the collection of options that the agent strictly prefers to the status quo represented by
the null vector 0; for relevant literature about sets of desirable options (or gambles), we
refer to References [14, 18, 28, 29].
Definition 3 (Coherent set of desirable options). We call a set of desirable options D ⊆ V
coherent if for all u and v in V and λ in R>0:
D1. 0 ∉D;
D2. if 0 ≺ u then u ∈D;
D3. if u ∈D then λu ∈D;
D4. if u,v ∈D then u+v ∈D.
We can regard a set of desirable options essentially as the restriction to pairwise compar-
isons of a choice function. Moreover, this restriction DC is coherent if the choice function C
it is based on, is coherent.
Given a coherent set of desirable options D, there may be multiple coherent choice
functions C such that DC =D.5 As shown by Bradley [3], and Van Camp et al. [25], there is
one unique least informative6 one, which we call CD , given by
CD(A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v−u ∉D} for all A in Q.
Since, as we will see, an exchangeability assessment amounts to a specific indifference
assessment, we now recall how to model such assessments [25, Section 5]. Next to D—the
options that the agent strictly prefers to 0—we consider the options in I ⊆V , which the agent
considers to be equivalent to the zero option.
Definition 4 (Coherent set of indifferent options). We call a set of indifferent options I
coherent if for all u and v in V and all λ in R:
I1. 0 ∈ I;
I2. if u ∈ V≻0∪V≺0 then u ∉ I;
I3. if u ∈ I then λu ∈ I;
I4. if u,v ∈ I then u+v ∈ I.
We collect all options that are indifferent to an option u in V into the equivalence class
[u] ∶= {v ∈V ∶ v−u ∈ I} = {u}+I. The set of all these equivalence classes is the quotient space
V/I ∶= {[u] ∶ u ∈ V}, a linear space itself. We provide it with the natural ordering inherited
from V:
ũ ⪯ ṽ⇔ (∃u ∈ ũ,v ∈ ṽ)u ⪯ v,
for all ũ and ṽ in V/I.
In the remainder of this section, we will recall some of the results about indifference
by Van Camp et al. [25], needed for this paper. Consider any coherent set of indifferent
options I.
Definition 5 (Compatibility of with a set of indifferent options). A choice function C is
called compatible with I if there is some representing choice function C′ on V/I such that
C(A) = {u ∈ A ∶ [u] ∈C′(A/I)}
for all A in Q(V).
5There may be even more incoherent choice functions C such that DC = D, but we are not interested in those
choice functions.
6This is the minimal element of the partially ordered set of all the coherent choice functions under the partial
order ⊑ given by C1 ⊑ C2⇔ (∀A ∈Q)C1(A) ⊇C2(A), for all choice functions C1 and C2.
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In this case, C′ is uniquely determined by C′(A/I) =C(A)/I for all A in Q(V), and, more-
over, C is coherent if and only if C′ is. Equivalently, we have the following useful character-
isation: C is compatible with I if and only if
0 ∈C(A)⇔ u ∈C(A), for all u in I and A ⊇ {0,u} in Q(V), (1)
which corresponds to the definition of indifference given by Seidenfeld [17].
For desirability, compatibility with a coherent set of indifferent options I is defined as
follows. We call a set of desirable gambles D compatible with I if D + I ⊆ D, and this is
equivalent to D =⋃D′ where D′ ⊆ V/I is the representing set of desirable options. In that
case, D′ is uniquely given by D′ =D/I—so D =⋃u∈D[u]—and, moreover, D is coherent if
and only if D′ is.
3. CONDITIONING CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Consider a choice function C on L(X ×R). With a non-empty subset B of X , we
associate a conditioned or updated choice function C⌋B on L(B×R), defined by
C⌋B(A) ∶= { f ∈ A ∶ IB f ∈C({IB f ∶ f ∈ A})} for all A in Q(L(B×R)).
We will also call C⌋B a conditional choice function.
In this definition, we let7 for any non-empty subset B of X and any f in L(B×R), IB f
be the gamble on X ×R given by




f (x,r) if x ∈ B
0 if x ∉ B
(2)
for all x in X and r in R. Note that, for any non-empty subset B of X , and all f and g in
L(B×R), we have that IB×RIB f = IB f , whence
f ≠ g⇔ (∃x ∈ B,r ∈R)( f (x,r) ≠ g(x,r))
⇔ (∃x ∈ B,r ∈R)(IB f (x,r) ≠ IBg(x,r))
⇔ (∃x ∈X ,r ∈R)(IB f (x,r) ≠ IBg(x,r))⇔ IB f ≠ IBg,
and also
f < g⇔ ( f ≤ g and f ≠ g)
⇔ ((∀x ∈ B,r ∈R)( f (x,r) ≤ g(x,r)) and IB f ≠ IBg)
⇔ ((∀x ∈ B,r ∈R)(IB f (x,r) ≤ IBg(x,r)) and IB f ≠ IBg)
⇔ ((∀x ∈X ,r ∈R)(IB f (x,r) ≤ IBg(x,r)) and IB f ≠ IBg)
⇔ (IB f ≤ IBg and IB f ≠ IBg)⇔ IB f < IBg.
We will use the simplifying notation IBA ∶= {IB f ∶ f ∈ A} ∈Q(L(X ×R)) for any A in
Q(L(B×R)), where, by Equation (2), IB f is the gamble on X ×R, that is equal to f on
B×R and to 0 on Bc×R. Using this notational convention,
C⌋B(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ IB f ∈C(IBA)} for all A in Q(L(B×R)),
or equivalently,
f ∈C⌋B(A)⇔ IB f ∈C(IBA), for all A in Q(L(B×R)) and all f in A.
The following property, which guarantees that conditioning preserves coherence, has
been established by Van Camp [23, Proposition 150]:
7IB is the indicator (gamble) defined on X—that assumes the value 1 on B and 0 on Bc—, while f is a gamble
defined on B×R: their domains differ, so their multiplication needs to be defined with some care.
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Proposition 1. Consider any choice function C on L(X ×R) and any non-empty subset B
of X . If C is coherent, then so is C⌋B.
4. FINITE EXCHANGEABILITY
Consider n in N variables X1, . . . , Xn taking values in a non-empty finite set X . The finite
possibility space for the uncertain sequence X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) is X n.
We denote by x = (x1, . . . ,xn) an arbitrary element of X n. For any n in N we let Pn be
the group of all permutations of the index set {1, . . . ,n}. There are ∣Pn∣ = n! such permu-
tations. With any such permutation π , we associate a permutation of X n, also denoted by
π , and defined by (πx)k ∶= xπ(k) for every k in {1, . . . ,n}, or in other words, π(x1, . . . ,xn) =
(xπ(1), . . . ,xπ(n)): πx is obtained from x by permuting the indices of its components. Simi-
larly, we lift π to a permutation π t on L(X n×R) by letting (π t f )(x,r) ∶= f (πx,r) for all
x in X n and r inR. Observe that π t is a linear permutation of the vector space L(X n×R)
of all vector-valued gambles on X n.
If a subject assesses that the sequence of variables X in X n is exchangeable, this means
that he is indifferent between any gamble f in L(X n×R) and its permuted variant π t f , for
all π in Pn. This leads to the following set of indifferent gambles:
IPn ∶= span{ f −π
t f ∶ f ∈L(X n×R) and π ∈Pn}. (3)
Definition 6 (Finite exchangeability). A choice function C on L(X n×R) is called (finitely)
exchangeable if it is compatible with IPn . Similarly, a set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(X
n×
R) is called (finitely) exchangeable if it is compatible with IPn .
Of course, so far, we do not yet know whether this notion of exchangeability is well-defined:
indeed, we do not know yet whether IPn is a coherent set of indifferent gambles, in the
sense of Definition 4. In the next section, we will show that this is indeed the case. But once
we have established that IPn is a coherent set of indifferent gambles, exchangeability is
nothing more fancy than compatibility with IPn . What we will do below, is use this general
representation result to obtain a particular equivalent representation result for exchangeable
choice functions, in terms of (vector-valued) gambles on count vectors.
4.1. Count vectors. Let us now provide the tools necessary to prove that IPn is a coherent
set of indifferent gambles, as introduced in Definition 4.
The permutation invariant atoms [x] ∶= {πx ∶ x ∈ X n}, with x in X n, are the smallest
permutation invariant subsets of X n. We consider the counting map
T ∶X n→N n∶x↦ T (x)
where T (x) is called the count vector of x. It is the X -tuple with components Tz(x) ∶=
∣{k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} ∶ xk = z}∣ for all z in X , so Tz(x) is the number of times that z occurs in the
sequence x1, . . . , xn. The range of T —the setN n—is called the set of possible count vectors
and is given by
N
n ∶= {m ∈ZX≥0 ∶ ∑
x∈X
mx = n}.
Applying any permutation to x leaves its result under the counting map unchanged:
T (x) = T (πx) for al x in X n and π in Pn.
For any x in X n, if m = T (x) then [x] = {y ∈X n ∶ T (y) = m}, so the permutation invariant
atom [x] is completely determined by the count vector m of all its elements, and is therefore
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also denoted by [T (x)] = [m]. Remark that {[m] ∶m ∈N n} partitions X n into disjoint parts




In order to extend the application of the count vectors for use with gambles, let us define
the set of all permutation invariant vector-valued gambles as
LPn(X
n
×R) ∶= { f ∈L(X n×R) ∶ (∀π ∈Pn)π t f = f} ⊆L(X n×R),













which, as we will see in the following proposition, is closely linked with LPn(X
n×R) (see
also References [6, 25] for a proof).
Proposition 2. invPn is a linear transformation of L(X
n×R), and
(i) invPn ○π
t = invPn = π
t ○ invPn for all π in P;
(ii) invPn ○ invPn = invPn ;
(iii) ker(invPn) = IPn ;
(iv) rng(invPn) =LPn(X
n×R).
Moreover, for any f and g in L(X n×R), we have that g ∈ f /IPn ⇔ invPng = invPn f .
So we see that invPn is a linear projection operator that renders a vector-valued gamble
insensitive to permutation (or permutation invariant) by replacing it with the uniform average
of all its permutations. As a result, it assumes the same value for all vector-valued gambles
that can be related to each other through some permutation: invPn( f ) = invPn(g) if f = π
tg
for some π in Pn, for all f and g in L(X n×R). Furthermore, for any f in L(X n×R), its
transformation invPn( f ) is permutation invariant and therefore constant on the permutation
invariant atoms [m]: (invPn( f ))(x,r) = (invPn( f ))(y,r) if [x] = [y], for all x and y in X
n,
and r inR. We can use the properties of invPn to prove that IPn is coherent and therefore
well suited for our definition of exchangeability.
Proposition 3. For any n in N, the set IPn , defined in Equation (3), is a coherent set of
indifferent vector-valued gambles.
Proof. For Axiom I1, since IPn is a linear hull by its Definition (3), 0 is included in IPn .
For Axiom I2, consider any f in IPn and assume ex absurdo that f ∈ L(X
n ×R)>0 ∪
L(X n×R)<0. If f ∈L(X n×R)>0 then π t f ∈L(X n×R)>0 for all π in Pn, and therefore
invPn( f ) > 0, a contradiction with Proposition 2(iii). If f ∈ L(X
n ×R)<0 then, similarly
invPn( f ) < 0, again a contradiction with Proposition 2(iii). Axioms I3 and I4 are satisfied
because IPn is a linear hull. 
Since IPn is coherent, exchangeability is well-defined: a choice function Cn on L(X
n×
R) and a set of desirable vector-valued gambles Dn ⊆ L(X n ×R) are exchangeable if
they are compatible with the coherent set of indifferent vector-valued gambles IPn . By
Definition 5, Cn is therefore represented by a choice function C′ on L(X n×R)/IPn , and
similarly, Dn is represented by a set of desirable gambles D′ ⊆L(X n×R)/IPn . So we can
focus on the quotient space and its elements: equivalence classes of mutually indifferent
vector-valued gambles.
But before we do that in the next section, it will pay to further explore the notions we
have introduced thus far. Consider any f in L(X n ×R). What is the constant value that
invPn( f ) assumes on a permutation invariant atom [m]? To answer this question, consider
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any x in [m], then




























where we used the fact that ∣Pn∣ = n! and ∣[m]∣ = (
n
m). Therefore, for all r inR,
(invPn( f ))(⋅,r) = ∑
m∈N n
Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m)I[m], (4)
where Hn(⋅∣m) is the linear expectation operator associated with the uniform distribution








g(y) for all g in L(X n) and m in N n. (5)
It characterises a (multivariate) hyper-geometric distribution [11], associated with random
sampling without replacement from an urn with n balls of types X , whose composition is
characterised by the count vector m.
The result of subjecting a gamble f on X n×R to the map
Hn∶L(X n×R)→L(N n×R)∶ f ↦Hn( f )
with (Hn( f ))(m,r) ∶=Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m) for all m in N and r inR, (6)
is the gamble Hn( f ) onN n×R that assumes the value 1(nm)
∑y∈[m] f (y,r) in every m inN
n
and r inR.
4.2. Exchangeable equivalence classes of gambles. We already know that exchangeable
choice functions are represented by choice functions on the quotient space L(X n×R)/IPn ,
and similarly for sets of desirable gambles. In the quest for an elegant representation
theorem, we thus need to focus on the quotient space L(X n ×R)/IPn and its elements,
which are ‘exchangeable’ equivalence classes of vector-valued gambles.
In this section we investigate how the representation of permutation invariant gambles
helps us find a representation result for exchangeable choice functions. This representation
will use equivalence classes [ f ] ∶= f /IPn = { f}+ IPn of gambles, for any f in L(X
n×R).
Recall that the quotient space L(X n ×R)/IPn ∶= {[ f ] ∶ f ∈ L(X
n ×R)} is a linear space
itself, with additive identity [0] = IPn , and therefore any element f̃ of L(X
n ×R)/IPn is
invariant under addition of IPn : f̃ + IPn = f̃ . Elements of L(X
n×R)/IPn will be generically
denoted by f̃ or g̃.
Proposition 4. Consider any f and g in L(X n×R). Then [ f ] = [g] if and only if Hn( f ) =
Hn(g).
Proof. By Proposition 2 we have that [ f ] = [g]⇔ invPn f = invPng, so it suffices to show
that invPn f = invPng⇔Hn( f ) =Hn(g). Observe that
invPn f = invPng⇔ (∀r ∈R)invPn( f )(⋅,r) = invPn(g)(⋅,r)
⇔ (∀r ∈R) ∑
m∈N n
Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m)I[m] = ∑
m∈N n
Hn(g(⋅,r)∣m)I[m]
⇔ (∀m ∈N n,r ∈R)Hn( f (⋅,r)∣m) =Hn(g(⋅,r)∣m)
⇔ (∀m ∈N n,r ∈R)Hn( f )(m,r) =Hn(g)(m,r)
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⇔Hn( f ) =Hn(g),
where the second equivalence follows from Equation (4) and the fourth one from Equa-
tion (6). 
Therefore, Hn is constant on the exchangeable equivalence classes of vector-valued
gambles: for any f̃ in L(X n ×R)/IPn , we have that Hn( f ) = Hn(g) for all f and g in f̃ .
This means that the map H̃n, defined by:
H̃n∶L(X n×R)/IPn →L(N
n
×R)∶ f̃ ↦Hn( f ) for any f in f̃ . (7)
is well defined. Proposition 4 guarantees that elements of L(X n ×R)/IPn can also be
characterised using H̃n, in the sense that f̃ = { f ∈L(X n×R) ∶Hn( f ) = H̃n( f̃ )} for all f̃ in
L(X n×R)/IPn .
The map H̃n takes as an argument any equivalence class of gambles, and maps it to some





×R)/IPn ∶h↦ [ ∑
m∈N n
h(m,⋅)I[m]]. (8)
The notation of H̃−1n is suggestive: as it turns out, H̃n and H̃
−1
n indeed are each other’s
inverses, and are therefore bijective.
Proposition 5. The maps H̃n as defined in Equation (7) and H̃−1n as defined in Equation (8)
are each other’s inverses.
Proof. This proof is structured as follows: we show that (i) H̃−1n ○ H̃n = idL(X n×R)/IPn , and
(ii) H̃n ○ H̃−1n = idL(N n×R), together implying that H̃n and H̃
−1
n are each other’s inverses.
For (i), consider any f̃ in L(X n×R)/IPn . We need to show that then H̃
−1
n (H̃n( f̃ )) = f̃ .
Let h be an arbitrary element of f̃ , and f ∶= invPn(h). By Proposition 2(ii) then invPn( f ) =
invPn(h), so f belongs to f̃ as well. Therefore H̃n( f̃ ) assumes the value Hn( f )(m,⋅) =
1
(nm)
∑y∈[m] f (y,⋅) on every m inN n. But f is constant on every permutation invariant atom
[m], so Hn( f )(m,⋅) = 1(nm) ∣[m]∣ f (x,⋅) = f (x,⋅) for every x in [m], and therefore
f = ∑
m∈N n
Hn( f )(m,⋅)I[m] = ∑
m∈N n
H̃n( f̃ )(m,⋅)I[m], (9)
where the second equality follows from Equation (7) and because f ∈ f̃ . Then indeed
H̃−1n (H̃n( f̃ )) = [∑m∈N n H̃n( f̃ )(m,⋅)I[m]] = [ f ] = f̃ , where the first equality follows from
Equation (8), the second one from Equation (9), and the last one from the fact that f ∈ f̃
and therefore [ f ] = f̃ .
For (ii), consider any h in L(N n ×R). We need to show that then H̃n(H̃−1n (h)) = h.
Let f ∶=∑m∈N n h(m,⋅)I[m], a gamble on X n×R. Then H̃−1n (h) = [ f ] by Equation (8), so
H̃n(H̃−1n (h)) = H̃n([ f ]), and since f ∈ [ f ], we find using Equation (7) that H̃n([ f ]) =Hn( f )
and therefore H̃n(H̃−1n (h)) = Hn( f ). The proof is finished if we can show that Hn( f ) = h.
Consider any m′ in N n, and observe that
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where the first equality follows from Equation (5) and the penultimate one from the facts











1 if m′ =m
0 otherwise
= I{m}(m′).
Therefore indeed h =Hn( f ) = H̃n(H̃−1n (h)). 
The importance of Proposition 5 lies in the fact that now, H̃n is a bijection between
L(X n×R)/IPn and L(N
n×R), and therefore, exchangeable equivalence classes of gam-












FIGURE 1. Commuting diagram for Hn and H̃n
The commuting diagram of Figure 1 above illustrates the surjections [⋅]∶L(X n×R)→
L(X n ×R)/IPn ∶ f ↦ [ f ] and Hn (indicated with a single arrow), and the bijection H̃n
(indicated with a double arrow). Since the representing choice function C′ is defined
from Cn through [⋅]—working point-wise on sets—this already suggests that C′ can be
transformed into a choice function on L(N n×R). To prove that they preserve coherence,
there is only one missing link: it suffices to show that the map H̃n is linear and preserves the
ordering between L(X n×R)/IPn and L(N
n×R).
Therefore, to define the ordering ⪯ on L(X n×R)/IPn , as usual, we let ⪯ be inherited by
the ordering ≤ on L(X n×R):
f̃ ⪯ g̃⇔ (∃ f ∈ f̃ ,∃g ∈ g̃) f ≤ g (10)
for all f̃ and g̃ in L(X n ×R)/IPn , turning L(X
n ×R)/IPn into an ordered linear space.
It turns out that this vector ordering on L(X n×R)/IPn also can be represented elegantly
using the map H̃n:
Proposition 6. Consider any f̃ and g̃ in L(X n×R)/IPn , then f̃ ⪯ g̃ if and only if H̃n( f̃ ) ≤
H̃n(g̃).
Proof. For necessity, assume that f̃ ⪯ g̃. Then, by Equation (10), f ≤ g for some f in
f̃ and g in g̃. Consider any m in N n, and infer that Hn( f )(m,⋅) = 1(nm)∑y∈[m] f (y,⋅) ≤
1
(nm)
∑y∈[m]g(y,⋅) = Hn(g)(m,⋅). Then Hn( f ) ≤ Hn(g), and therefore, by Equation (7),
indeed H̃n( f̃ ) ≤ H̃n(g̃).
For sufficiency, assume that H̃n( f̃ ) ≤ H̃n(g̃). Then, by Equation (7) and Proposition 4,
Hn( f ) ≤ Hn(g) for all f in f̃ and g in g̃. Consider any f in f̃ and g in g̃ and let f ′ ∶=
invPn( f ) and g
′ ∶= invPn(g). Then invPn( f
′) = invPn( f ) and invPn(g
′) = invPn(g) by
Proposition 2(ii), so Proposition 4 implies that f ′ ∈ f̃ and g′ ∈ f̃ , and therefore Hn( f ′) ≤
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m in N n. But f ′ and g′ are constant on every [m], so f ′(y,⋅) ≤ g′(y,⋅) for every y in [m]
and every m in N n. Then f ′ ≤ g′, and therefore indeed f̃ ⪯ g̃. 
Propositions 5 and 6 imply that H̃n is a linear order isomorphism between L(X n×R)/IPn
and L(N n ×R), and therefore, every coherent choice function on L(X n ×R)/IPn can
be identified with a coherent choice function on L(N n×R). We will use this interesting
conclusion in the next section.
4.3. A representation theorem. Now that the preparatory work is done, we are ready to
establish our representation for coherent and exchangeable choice functions.
Theorem 7 (Finite representation). Consider any choice function Cn on L(X n×R). Then
Cn is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing choice function C̃ on
L(N n×R) such that
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Hn( f ) ∈ C̃(Hn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Furthermore, in that case, C̃ is given by C̃(Hn(A))=Hn(Cn(A)) for all A inQ(L(X n×R)).
Finally, Cn is coherent if and only if C̃ is. We call C̃ the count representation of Cn.
Similarly, consider any set of desirable gambles Dn ⊆L(X n×R). Then Dn is exchange-
able if and only if there is a unique representing set of desirable gambles D̃ ⊆L(N n×R)
such that Dn =⋃H̃−1n (D̃). Furthermore, in that case, D̃ is given by D̃ = Hn(Dn). Finally,
Dn is coherent if and only if D̃ is. We call D̃ the count representation of Dn.
Proof. We begin with the representation of choice functions. For the first statement, note that
Cn is exchangeable is equivalent to Cn is compatible with IPn , by Definition 6. Equivalently,
by Definition 5, there is some representing choice function C′ on L(X n ×R)/IPn such
that Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶ [ f ] ∈C′(A/IPn)} for all A in Q(L(X
n×R)). We use the linear order
isomorphism H̃n to define a choice function C̃ on L(N n×R): we let [ f ] ∈C′(A/IPn)⇔
H̃n([ f ]) ∈ C̃(H̃n(A/IPn)) for all f in L(X
n×R) and A in Q(L(X n×R)). Since f ∈ [ f ],
use Proposition 4 and Equation (7) to infer that H̃n([ f ]) = Hn( f ). Similarly, infer that
H̃n(A/IPn) = {H̃n([g]) ∶ g ∈ A} = {Hn(g) ∶ g ∈ A} = Hn(A), so [ f ] ∈C
′(A/IPn)⇔Hn( f ) ∈
C̃(Hn(A)). Then indeed
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Hn( f ) ∈ C̃(Hn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
To show that C̃ is unique, use that C′ is unique and H̃n is a bijection.
For the second statement, consider any A in Q(L(X n×R)) and infer, using the defini-
tion of C̃, that C̃(H̃n(A/IPn)) = H̃n(C
′(A/IPn)), and therefore C̃(Hn(A)) = H̃n(C
′(A/IPn))
by Equation (7). By compatibility, we have that C′(A/IPn) =Cn(A)/IPn , so we find that
H̃n(C′(A/IPn)) = H̃n(Cn(A)/IPn) = Hn(Cn(A)), by Equation (7), and therefore indeed
C̃(Hn(A)) =Hn(Cn(A)).
For the third statement, the compatibility with IPn guarantees that Cn is coherent if and
only if its representing choice function C′ on L(X n ×R)/IPn is coherent. But since C̃ is
defined from C′ using the linear order isomorphism Hn, we have immediately that C̃ is
coherent if and only if C′ is coherent.
The representation of sets of desirable gambles is a trivial extension to vector-valued
gambles of the proof given in Reference [6, Theorem 17]. 
The number of occurrences of any outcome in a sequence (x1, . . . ,xn) is fixed by its count
vector m in N n. If we impose an exchangeability assessment on it, then we see, using
Theorem 7, that the joint model on X n is characterised by a model on L(N n×R). So an
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exchangeable choice function Cn essentially represents preferences between gambles on the
unknown composition m of an urn with n balls of types X : the choice Cn(A) between the
gambles in A is based on m.
This representation result immediately translates to rejection functions. A rejection
function R on L(X n ×R) is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing
rejection function R̃ on L(N n×R), given by R̃(Hn(A))=Hn(R(A)) for all A inQ(L(X n×
R)), that represents R, and that is coherent if and only if R is.
4.4. Conditioning exchangeable models. We use the same notation and ideas as in Refer-
ence [6, Section 4.4] for desirability, and generalise it to choice models.
Consider an exchangeable and coherent choice function C on L(X n×R), and assume
that we have observed the values x̌ ∶= (x̌1, . . . , x̌ň) of the first ň variables X1, . . . , Xň, and that
we want to make inferences about the remaining n̂ ∶= n− ň variables. To do this, we simply
condition the choice function C on the singleton {x̌}:8
f ∈C⌋x̌(A)⇔ I{x̌} f ∈C(I{x̌}A) for all A in Q(L(X n̂×R)) and f in A,
following the general discussion in Section 3.
Proposition 8. Consider any x̌ in X ň and any coherent and exchangeable choice function
C on L(X n×R). Then C⌋x̌ is a coherent and exchangeable choice function on L(X n̂×R).
Proof. That C⌋x̌ is coherent, follows from Proposition 1. It therefore suffices to show that
C⌋x̌ is exchangeable. By Definition 6, we need to show that C⌋x̌ is compatible with IPn̂ . By
Equation (1), this is equivalent to
(∀g ∈ IPn̂)(∀A ∈Q(L(X
n̂
×R)))({0,g} ⊆ A⇒ (0 ∈C⌋x̌(A)⇔ g ∈C⌋x̌(A))).
So consider any g in IPn̂ and any A in Q(L(X
n̂ ×R)) such that {0,g} ⊆ A. It suffices to
show that then 0 ∈C(I{x̌}A)⇔ I{x̌}g ∈C(I{x̌}A). Since C is exchangeable—compatible
with IPn—and again using Equation (1), this will be the case if we can prove that I{x̌}g
belongs to IPn . To show this, since g ∈ IPn̂ , observe by Equation (3) that g =∑
m
i=1 λi( fi− π̂
t
i fi)
for some m in N, λ1, . . . , λm in R, f1, . . . , fm in L(X n̂ ×R), and π̂1, . . . , π̂m in Pn̂. For





k if k ∈ {1, . . . , ň}
ň+ π̂i(k− ň) if k ∈ {ň+1, . . . ,n}
for all k in {1, . . . ,n},
being a permutation that is constant on the first ň components. Then I{x̌}π̂ ti fi = πit(I{x̌} fi)










so I{x̌}g indeed belongs to IPn . 
8Actually, the conditioning event is {x̌}×X n̂. In order to streamline the argument and the notation, we will
identify {x̌} with {x̌}×X n̂, which comes down to identifying gambles (and in particular indicators) with their
cylindrical extensions, as is commonly done in the literature [4, 5]. See Section 5 for more information about the
cylindrical extension. Formally, the conditional choice function C⌋x̌ is defined onQ(L({x̌}×X n̂×R)), but since
any gamble f in L({x̌}×X n̂ ×R) can be uniquely identified with the gamble f (x̌,⋅) in L(X n̂ ×R), we can
equivalently define C⌋x̌ onQ(L(X n̂ ×R)).
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We also introduce another type of conditioning, where we observe a count vector m̌ inN ň,
and we condition the choice function C on all the possible sequences [m̌] with these counts,
to obtain C⌋[m̌]. The domain of this conditional choice function is Q(L([m̌]×X n̂×R)),
and we are interested in its marginal choice function margn̂(C⌋[m̌]) about the n̂ remaining
variables Xň+1, . . . , Xn, which is defined as




f ∈ (margn̂(C⌋[m̌]))(A)⇔ I[m̌] f ∈C(I[m̌]A),for all A in Q(L(X
n̂
×R)) and f in A.
To simplify the notation, let C⌋m̌ ∶= margn̂(C⌋[m̌]). Interestingly, the count vector m̌ for
an observed sample x̌ is a sufficient statistic in the sense that it extracts from x̌ all the
information that is needed to characterise the conditional model:
Proposition 9 (Sufficiency of the observed count vector). Consider any coherent and
exchangeable choice function C on L(X n×R), and any x̌ and y̌ in X ň. If [x̌] = [y̌], or in
other words, if T (x̌) = T (y̌) =∶ m̌, then C⌋x̌ =C⌋y̌ =C⌋m̌.
Proof. From [x̌] = [y̌], infer that y̌ = π̌ x̌ for some π̌ in Pň, and from T (x̌) = T (y̌) = m̌, infer




Hn(I[m̌]A) for all A in Q(L(X n̂×R)).






−1(k) if k ∈ {1, . . . , ň}
k if k ∈ {ň+1, . . . ,n}
for all k in {1, . . . ,n}.
We claim that then π t(I{x̌} f ) = I{y̌} f for all f in A. To establish this, consider any ž =
(ž1, . . . , žn) in X n and any r inR, and observe that indeed
(π
t




f (π(žň+1, . . . , žn),r) if π(ž1, . . . , žň) = x̌





f (žň+1, . . . , žn,r) if (ž1, . . . , žň) = π̌ x̌
0 if (ž1, . . . , žň) = π̌ x̌
= I{π̌ x̌} f (ž,r) = I{y̌} f (ž,r).
So we see that π t(I{x̌} f ) = I{y̌} f and therefore I{x̌} f − I{y̌} f ∈ IPn , whence [I{x̌} f ] =
[I{y̌} f ]. By Proposition 4, observe that then Hn(I{x̌} f ) =Hn(I{y̌} f ) for all f in A, whence
Hn(I{x̌}A) = Hn(I{y̌}A). To show that this is also equal to 1∣[m̌]∣Hn(I[m̌]A), observe that
[m̌] = {ϖ̌ x̌ ∶ ϖ̌ ∈ Pň}, and therefore for any ž in [m̌], we can select a π̌ž in Pň such that
π̌žx̌ = ž. With this π̌ž we construct a permutation πž in the manner described above, which
satisfies π tž(I{x̌} f ) = I{ž} f for every f in A. Use I[m̌] f =∑ž∈[m̌] I{ž} f for every f in A to in-
fer that indeed Hn(I[m̌]A) =Hn(∑ž∈[m̌] I{ž}A) =∑ž∈[m̌]Hn(I{ž}A) = ∣[m̌]∣Hn(I{x̌}A), where
the last equation holds because we have already shown that Hn(I{ž}A) = Hn(I{x̌}A) for
every ž in [x̌] = [m̌].
Now we are ready to show that C⌋x̌ =C⌋y̌ =C⌋m̌. Since they are coherent, it suffices to
show that
0 ∈C⌋x̌(A)⇔ 0 ∈C⌋y̌(A)⇔ 0 ∈C⌋m̌(A), for all A in Q(L(X n̂×R)),
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and therefore, taking into account that C⌋m̌ =margn̂(C⌋[m̌]), that
0 ∈C(I{x̌}A)⇔ 0 ∈C(I{y̌}A)⇔ 0 ∈C(I[m̌]A), for all A in Q(L(X n̂×R)).
Because C is exchangeable, by Theorem 7 it suffices to show that
0 ∈C(Hn(I{x̌}A))⇔ 0 ∈C(Hn(I{y̌}A))⇔ 0 ∈C(Hn(I[m̌]A)),
for all A in Q(L(X n̂ ×R)). But we have shown above that Hn(I{x̌}A) = Hn(I{y̌}A) =
1
∣[m̌]∣Hn(I[m̌]A), so taking coherence [and more specifically, Axiom C4a] into account, this
is indeed the case. 
4.5. Finite representation in terms of polynomials. In Section 5, we will prove a similar
representation theorem for infinite sequences. Since it no longer makes sense to count
in such sequences, we first need to find a equivalent representation theorem in terms of
something that does not depend on counts. More specifically, we need, for every n in N
another order-isomorphic linear space to L(X n ×R)/IPn that allows for embedding: the
linear space for any n1 ≤ n2 (both in N) must be a subspace of the one for n2.
All the relevant maps in this section have been introduced by De Cooman et al. [6, 7].
We use their ideas and work with polynomials on the X -simplex
ΣX ∶= {θ ∈RX ∶ θ ≥ 0,∑
x∈X
θx = 1}.
We consider the special subset V(ΣX ×R) of L(ΣX ×R): V(ΣX ×R) are the polynomial
vector-valued gambles on ΣX ×R, which are those gambles h such that for every r inR,
h(⋅,r) is the restriction to ΣX of a multivariate polynomial pr on RX , in the sense that
h(θ ,r) = pr(θ) for all θ in ΣX . We call pr then a representation of h(⋅,r). It will be useful
to introduce a notation for polynomial vector-valued gambles with fixed degree n in N:
Vn(ΣX ×R) is the collection of all polynomial vector-valued gambles h such that for every
r inR, h(⋅,r) has at least one representation whose degree is not higher than n. As shown
in References [4, 6], both V(ΣX ×R) and Vn(ΣX ×R) are linear subspaces of L(ΣX ×R),
and, as we wanted, for n1 ≤ n2, Vn1(ΣX ×R) is a subspace of Vn2(ΣX ×R).
Special polynomial gambles are the Bernstein gambles:
Definition 7 (Bernstein gambles). Consider any n in N and any m in N n. Define the
Bernstein basis polynomial Bm on RX as Bm(θ) ∶= (nm)∏x∈X θ
mx
x for all θ in RX . The
restriction of Bm to ΣX is called a Bernstein gamble, which we also denote as Bm.
As mentioned by De Cooman and Quaeghebeur [6] and proved explicitly by De Bock et
al. [4], the set of all Bernstein gambles constitutes a basis for the linear space Vn(ΣX ):
Proposition 10 ([6, Appendix B], [4, Proposition 14]). Consider any n in N. The set of
Bernstein gambles {Bm ∶m ∈N n} constitutes a basis for the linear space Vn(ΣX ). Therefore,
each element p of Vn(ΣX ×R) can be uniquely written as p(θ ,r) =∑m∈N n α(m,r)Bm(θ)
for every θ in ΣX and r inR.
As we have seen, to preserve coherence between two ordered linear spaces, we need
a linear order isomorphism. So we wonder whether there is one between L(X n×R)/IPn
and Vn(ΣX ×R). In Section 4.2 we have seen that there is one between L(X n ×R)/IPn
and L(N n ×R), namely H̃n. Therefore, it suffices to find one between L(N n ×R) and
Vn(ΣX ×R). Consider the map
CoMn∶L(N n×R)→ Vn(ΣX ×R)∶h↦ ∑
m∈N n
h(m,⋅)Bm.
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Before we can establish that CoMn is a linear order isomorphism, we need to provide the
linear space Vn(ΣX ×R) with an order ⪯nB . To this end, we use the proper cone {0}∪
posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n}):
h1 ⪯nB h2⇔ (∀r ∈R)h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈ {0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n}),
for all h1 and h2 in Vn(ΣX ×R).
The following proposition is essentially due to De Cooman and Quaeghebeur [6]: it
suffices to apply their result point-wise, for every r inR.
Proposition 11 ([6, Section 4.9], [4, Section 4.5]). Consider any n in N. Then the map
CoMn is a linear order isomorphism between the ordered linear spaces L(N n×R) and
Vn(ΣX ×R).
The linear order isomorphism CoMn helps us to define a linear order isomorphism be-
tween the linear spaces L(X n×R) and Vn(ΣX ×R), a final tool needed for a representation
theorem in terms of polynomial gambles. Indeed, consider the map Mn ∶=CoMn ○Hn:
Mn∶L(X n×R)→ Vn(ΣX ×R)∶ f ↦Mn( f )
where Mn( f )(θ ,r) ∶= Mn( f (⋅,r)∣θ) for all θ in ΣX and r in R. Mn(⋅∣θ) is the linear
expectation operator associated with the multinomial distribution whose parameters are n




M̃n ∶=CoMn ○ H̃n,
mapping L(X n×R)/IPn to V
n(ΣX ×R). M̃n is a composition of two linear order isomor-
phisms, and is therefore a linear order isomorphism itself. Due to Proposition 4, considering
any f̃ in L(X n×R)/IPn , Mn is constant on f̃ , and the value it takes on any element of f̃ is
















FIGURE 2. Commuting diagram for CoMn, M̃n and H̃n
The commuting diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the surjections [⋅], Hn and Mn, and the
bijections H̃n, M̃n and CoMn. It shows that both L(N n ×R) and Vn(ΣX ×R) are order-
isomorphic to L(X n×R)/IPn , so they are both suitable for defining a representing choice
function on: in Theorem 7 we used the space L(N n×R), and here, in Theorem 12, we will
use the other equivalent space Vn(ΣX ×R).
Theorem 12 (Finite polynomial representation). Consider any choice function Cn on
L(X n×R). Then Cn is exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing choice
function C̃ on Vn(ΣX ×R) such that
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
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Furthermore, C̃ is then given by C̃(Mn(A)) = Mn(Cn(A)) for all A in Q(L(X n ×R)).
Finally, Cn is coherent if and only if C̃ is. We call C̃ the frequency representation of Cn.
Similarly, consider any set of desirable gambles Dn ⊆L(X n×R). Then Dn is exchange-
able if and only if there is a unique representing set of desirable gambles D̃ ⊆ Vn(ΣX ×R)
such that Dn =⋃M̃−1n (D̃). Furthermore, in that case, D̃ is given by D̃ = Mn(Dn). Finally,
Dn is coherent if and only if D̃ is. We call D̃ the frequency representation of Dn.
Proof. The part for desirability has essentially already been proved in Reference [6, Theo-
rem 21]. Here, we give a shorter alternative proof that also works for choice functions.
Let C′′ on L(N n×R) and D′′ ⊆L(N n×R) be the representing choice function and set
of desirable gambles from Theorem 7, and let C̃ be defined by
CoMn( f ) ∈ C̃(CoMn(A))⇔ f ∈C′′(A)
for all A in Q(L(N n×R)) and f in A, and D̃ ∶=CoMn(D′′). Since CoMn is a linear order
isomorphism, C̃ and D̃ are unique, and Mn( f ) ∈ C̃(Mn(A))⇔Hn( f ) ∈C′′(Hn(A)) for all
A inQ(L(X n)×R) and f in A, and D̃ =CoMn(Hn(Dn)) =Mn(Dn), and all the coherence
properties are preserved, from which the statements follow. 
4.6. Conditioning in terms of polynomials. It turns out that conditioning an exchangeable
choice function can be done very easily using the frequency representation. Assume that we
observe a count vector m̌ in N ň, and we condition the choice function C on [m̌], to obtain
the conditional choice function C⌋m̌ ∶=margn̂(C⌋[m̌]) on L(X
n̂×R), which is exchangeable
by Propositions 8 and 9. What is its frequency representation, then?
Proposition 13. Consider any coherent and exchangeable choice function C on L(X n×R),
and any m̌ in N n. If C̃ on Vn(ΣX ×R) is the frequency representation of C, then the
frequency representation of C⌋m̌ is the choice function C̃⌋m̌ on V n̂(ΣX ×R), defined by
ĥ ∈ C̃⌋m̌(Â)⇔ Bm̌ĥ ∈ C̃(Bm̌Â), for all Â in Q(V n̂(ΣX ×R)) and ĥ in Â
Proof. Since C is exchangeable with frequency representation C̃, by Theorem 12 we have
that
C(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Consider any x̌ in [m̌]. Then C⌋m̌ =C⌋x̌ by Proposition 9, so
C⌋m̌(Â) =C⌋x̌(Â) = { f̂ ∈ Â ∶Mn(I{x̌} f̂ ) ∈ C̃(Mn(I{x̌}Â))} for all Â in Q(L(X n̂×R)).




C⌋m̌(Â) = { f̂ ∈ Â ∶Mn(I{x̌} f̂ ) ∈ C̃(Mn(I{x̌}Â))}
= { f̂ ∈ Â ∶ ∣[m̌]∣Mn(I{x̌} f̂ ) ∈ C̃(∣[m̌]∣Mn(I{x̌}Â))}
= { f̂ ∈ Â ∶ Bm̌Mn̂( f̂ ) ∈ C̃(Bm̌Mn̂(Â))}
= { f̂ ∈ Â ∶Mn̂( f̂ ) ∈ C̃⌋m̌(Mn̂(Â))} for all Â in Q(L(X n̂×R)),
taking coherence of C̃ [more specifically, Axiom C4a] into account, so C̃⌋m̌ is the frequency
representation of C⌋m̌. Since Mn works element-wise on I{x̌}Â, it even suffices to show that
Mn(I{x̌} f̂ ) = 1∣[m̌]∣Bm̌Mn̂( f̂ ) for every f̂ in Â. Lemma 14 establishes this. 
Lemma 14. Consider any ň < n, m̌ in N ň, x̌ in m̌ and f̂ in L(X n̂×R). Then Mn(I{x̌} f̂ ) =
1
∣[m̌]∣Bm̌Mn̂( f̂ )
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Proof. Consider any f̂ in Â, any θ in ΣX and any r inR. Then









Consider some m in N . Since




f̂ (yň+1, . . . ,yn,r) if (y1, . . . ,xň) = x̌
0 if (y1, . . . ,xň) ≠ x̌
for all y = (y1, . . . ,yn) in [m] (11)
we have that m ≥ m̌⇔∑y∈[m] I{x̌} f̂ (y,r) ≠ 0, so










Consider some m in N n Then m ≥ m̌ if and only if m̂ ∶= m− m̌ ≥ 0, so m ≥ m̌ if and only if
m̂ ∈N n̂. In that case, m̂ is a count vector itself. Assume that m ≥ m̌. Then
∑
y∈[m]
I{x̌} f̂ (y,r) = ∑
(y1,...,yn)∈[m]





I{x̌} f̂ (y1, . . . ,yn,r)
= ∑
(yň+1,...,yn)∈[m̂]
f̂ (yň+1, . . . ,yn,r) = ∑
y∈[m̂]
f̂ (y,r),

























Taking these observations into account, we find that














Bm̌(θ)Mn̂( f̂ )(θ ,r).
Since our choice of θ in ΣX and r in R was arbitrary, therefore indeed Mn(I{x̌} f̂ ) =
1
∣[m̌]∣Bm̌Mn̂( f̂ ). 
5. COUNTABLE EXCHANGEABILITY
In the previous section, we assumed a finite sequence X1,. . . , Xn to be exchangeable, and
inferred representation theorems. Here, we will consider the countable sequence X1, . . . , Xn,
. . . to be exchangeable, and derive representation theorems for such an assessment. We will
call XN ∶=⨉ j∈NX , the set of all possible countable sequences where each variable takes
values in X .
First, we need a way to relate gambles on different domains. This will be done using
cylindrical extension:
f ∗(x,r) ∶= f (x1, . . . ,xn,r) for all x ∶= (x1, . . . ,xn, . . .) in XN and r inR.
for any gamble f on X n×R.
Formally, f ∗ belongs to L(XN ×R) while f belongs to L(X n ×R). However, they
contain the same information, and therefore, are indistinguishable from a behavioural
point of view. We will resort to the simplifying device of identifying f with its cylindrical
extension f ∗.
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Next, we need a way to relate choice functions and sets of desirable gambles on different
domains. We will do this using marginalisation: Given any choice function C on L(XN×R)
and any n in N, its X n-marginal Cn is determined by
Cn(A) ∶=C(A) for all A in Q(L(X n)×R). (12)
Similarly, given any set of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN ×R) and any n in N, its X n-
marginal Dn is Dn ∶=D∩L(X n×R).
Coherence is preserved under marginalisation [it is an immediate consequence of the
definition; see, amongst others, Reference [5, Proposition 6] for sets of desirable gambles].
Proposition 15. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(XN×R) and any coherent
set of desirable gambles D ⊆L(XN×R). Then for every n in N, their X n-marginals Cn and
Dn are coherent.
5.1. Vector-valued gambles of finite structure. Before we can explain what it means
to assess a countable sequence to be exchangeable, we need to realise that now there are
infinitely many variables. From an operational point of view, it will be impossible to describe
choice between gambles that depend upon an infinite number of variables. Indeed, since we
can never observe the actual outcome in a finite time, gambles will never be actually paid off,
and hence every assessment is essentially without any risk. But, it does make operational
and behavioural sense to consider choices between gambles of finite structure: gambles
that each depend on a finite number of variables only. See Reference [4, Section 3.2] for a
discussion.
Definition 8 (Gambles of finite structure). We will call any vector-valued gamble that
depends only on a finite number of variables a vector-valued gamble of finite structure. We
collect all such gambles in the set L(XN×R):
L(X
N





L(XN ×R) is a linear space, with the usual ordering ≤: for any f and g in L(XN ×R),
f ≤ g⇔ f (x,r) ≤ g(x,r) for all x in XN and r inR.
Due to our finitary approach, we can even establish a converse result to Proposition 15,
whose proof is a straightforward verification of all the axioms.
Proposition 16. Consider any choice function C on L(XN×R), and any set of desirable
gambles D ⊆L(XN×R). If for every n in N, its X n-marginal Cn on L(X n×R) is coherent,
then C is coherent. Similarly, if for every n in N, its X n-marginal Dn ⊆ L(X n ×R) is
coherent, then D is coherent.
Proof. We restrict ourselves to proving this for choice functions; the proof for desirability
can be found in Reference [4, Proposition 4]. Consider any A in Q(L(XN ×R)). Then
any f in A depends—besides on the value of R—on a finite number of variables n f ∈N.
Let n ∶= max{n f ∶ f ∈ A}, which is a well-defined natural number since A is finite. Every
(cylindrical extension of) f in A is then a gamble on X n. It follows then from Equation (12)
that C(A) =Cn(A).
The proof follows readily once we realise that, following the procedure above, for every
option set A there is some n in N such that C(A) =Cn(A); for Axiom C3, we need to
consider A∪A1∪A2 rather than A. 
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5.2. Set of indifferent gambles. If a subject assesses the sequence of variables X1, . . . ,
Xn, . . . to be exchangeable, this means that he is indifferent between any gamble f in
L(XN ×R) and its permuted variant π t f , for any π in Pn, where n now is the (finite)
number of variables that f depends upon: his set of indifferent gambles is
IP ∶= { f ∈L(XN×R) ∶ (∃n ∈N) f ∈ IPn} = ⋃
n∈N
IPn .
If we want to use IP to define countable exchangeability, it must be a coherent set of
indifferent gambles.
Proposition 17. The set IP is a coherent set of indifferent gambles.
Proof. For Axiom I1, since, by Proposition 3, 0 ∈ IPn for every n in N, also 0 ∈ IP . For
Axiom I2, consider any f in IP , then there is some n in N for which f ∈ IPn . By Proposition 3,
we infer that indeed f /< 0 and f /> 0. For Axioms I3 and I4, consider any f1, f2 and f3 in
IP and any λ in R. Then there are ni in N such that fi ∈ IPni , for every i in {1,2,3}. Let
n ∶= max{n1,n2,n3}. Then f1, f2 and f3 are elements of IPn , so λ f1 ∈ IPn and f2+ f3 ∈ IPn
by Proposition 3. Then indeed λ f1 ∈ IP and f2+ f3 ∈ IP , so IP is indeed a linear space. 
Countable exchangeability is now easily defined, similarly to the finitary definition.
Definition 9. A choice function C on L(XN ×R) is called (countably) exchangeable if
C is compatible with IP . Similarly, a set of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN ×R) is called
(countably) exchangeable if it is compatible with IP .
This definition is closely related to its finitary counterpart:
Proposition 18. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(XN ×R). Then C is ex-
changeable if and only if for every n in N, the X n-marginal Cn of C is exchangeable.
Similarly, consider any coherent set of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN ×R). Then D is
exchangeable if and only if for every choice of n in N, the X n-marginal Dn of D is exchange-
able.
Proof. The proof for sets of desirable real-valued gambles, in the more general context of
partial exchangeability, can be found in Reference [4, Proposition 18], and can be trivially
extended to vector-valued gambles.
We give the proof for choice functions. For necessity, assume that C is exchangeable, or
equivalently, that C is compatible with IP . Use Equation (1) to infer that then, equivalently,
(∀h̃ ∈ IP)(∀Ã ∈Q(L(XN×R)))({0, h̃} ⊆ Ã⇒ (0 ∈C(Ã)⇔ h̃ ∈C(Ã))). (13)
Consider any n in N. We need to prove that then Cn is compatible with IPn , or equivalently,
that
(∀h ∈ IPn)(∀A ∈Q(L(X
n
×R)))({0,h} ⊆ A⇒ (0 ∈Cn(A)⇔ h ∈Cn(A))). (14)
So consider any A ⊇ {0} inQ(L(X n×R)) and h in A. Then A is an element ofQ(L(XN×
R)) and h an element of L(XN×R), so 0 ∈C(A)⇔ h ∈C(A) by Equation (13). Therefore,
after marginalising, 0 ∈Cn(A)⇔ h ∈Cn(A), so Cn is compatible with IPn , and by Definition 9
therefore indeed exchangeable.
For sufficiency, assume that Cn is exchangeable for every n in N—so it satisfies Equa-
tion (14) for every n in N. We need to prove that then C is exchangeable. Using Equation (13),
it suffices to consider any Ã in Q(L(XN×R)) such that 0 ∈ Ã, and any h̃ in Ã, and prove
that 0 ∈C(Ã)⇔ h̃ ∈C(Ã). Since Ã∪{h̃} consists of gambles of finite structure, there is some
(sufficiently large) n in N for which Ã ∈Q(L(X n×R)), and therefore also h̃ ∈L(X n×R).
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Then by Equation (14), 0 ∈Cn(Ã)⇔ h̃ ∈Cn(Ã), so 0 ∈C(Ã)⇔ h̃ ∈C(Ã), whence C is
compatible with IP , and therefore indeed exchangeable. 
5.3. A representation theorem for countable sequences. We will look for a similar rep-
resentation result to the finite case. However, since we no longer deal with finite sequences
of length n, now the representing choice function will no longer be defined on Vn(ΣX ×R),
















FIGURE 3. Commuting diagram for countable exchangeability
Consider the commuting diagram of Figure 3, where a dashed line represents an embed-
ding: for every n in N, Vn(ΣX ×R) is a subspace of V(ΣX ×R). This shows the importance
of the polynomial representation.
As we have seen, in order to define coherent choice functions on some linear space, we
need to provide it with a vector ordering. Similar to what we did before, we use the proper
cone {0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n,n ∈N}) to define the order ⪯B on V(ΣX ×R):
h1 ⪯B h2⇔ (∀r ∈R)h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈ {0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n,n ∈N})
for all h1 and h2 in V(ΣX ×R).
Keeping Propositions 15 and 16 in mind, the following results are not surprising.
Proposition 19. Consider any choice function C′ on V(ΣX ×R). Then C′ is coherent if
and only if for every n in N the choice function C′n, defined by C′n(A) ∶=C′(A) for all A in
Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)), is coherent.
Proof. We only prove sufficiency, since necessity is trivial. So consider any C′ on V(ΣX ×
R) such that for every n in N, C′n is coherent. We prove that then C′ is coherent.
For Axiom C1, consider any A inQ(V(ΣX ×R)). Then every polynomial in the finite set
A has a certain degree; let n be the maximum of those degrees. Then A ∈Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)),
whence indeed C′(A) =C′n(A) ≠∅, since C
′
n is coherent.
For Axiom C2, consider any h1 and h2 in V(ΣX ×R) such that h1 ≺B h2. Then h2(⋅,r)−
h1(⋅,r) ∈ {0}∪posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n,n ∈N}) for all r inR, and h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶
m ∈N n,n ∈N}) for some r inR. LetR′ ∶= {r ∈R ∶ h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ≠ 0} ⊆R be the non-
empty set of rewards for which h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) belongs to posi({Bm ∶ m ∈N n,n ∈N});
then h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) = 0 for all r in R∖R′. Consider, for every r in R′, a representing
polynomial pr of h1(⋅,r), and let n1 be the degree of the representing polynomial in the
finite set {pr ∶ r ∈R′} with highest degree. Then, for every r inR′, h1(⋅,r) is represented by
a polynomial in Vn1(ΣX ). Similarly, we find that, for every r inR′, h2(⋅,r) is represented
by a polynomial in Vn2(ΣX ) for some n2 in N. Let n ∶= max{n1,n2}. Then, for every r
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inR′, there is a representing polynomial of h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) whose degree is not higher
than n, so h2−h1 ∈ Vn(ΣX ) and therefore h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n}). Since
h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) = 0 for every r inR∖R′, this guarantees that (∀r ∈R)h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) ∈
{0}∪ posi({Bm ∶ m ∈N n,n ∈ N}), or, in other words, that h1 ≺nB h2, whence indeed h1 ∉
C′n({h1,h2}) =C
′({h1,h2}), since C′n is coherent.
For Axiom C3, consider any A, A1 and A2 in V(ΣX ×R). Using the similar construction
as for Axiom C2, we find that then A∪A1∪A2 ⊆ Vn(ΣX ×R), for some n in N. Then A, A1
and A2 all are elements of Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)). For Axiom C3a, assume that C′(A2) ⊆ A2∖A1
and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A. Then C′n(A2) ⊆ A2∖A1 and therefore, since C
′
n is coherent, indeed C
′(A) =
C′n(A) ⊆ A∖A1. For Axiom C3b, assume that C
′(A2) ⊆ A2∖A1 and A ⊆ A1. Then C′n(A2) ⊆
A2∖A1 and therefore, since C′n is coherent, indeed C
′(A2∖A) =C′n(A2∖A) ⊆ A2∖A1.
For Axiom C4, consider any h in V(ΣX ×R), any λ in R>0 and any A1 and A2 in
Q(V(ΣX ×R)). Using the similar construction as for Axiom C2, we find that then {h}∪
A1 ∪A2 ⊆ Vn(ΣX ×R), for some n in N. Then h ∈ Vn(ΣX ×R) and A1 and A2 both are
elements ofQ(Vn(ΣX ×R)). Assume that A1 ⊆C′(A2) =C′n(A2), then, since C
′
n is coherent,
indeed λA1 ⊆C′n(λA2) =C
′(λA2) and A1+{h} ⊆C′n(A2+{h}) =C
′(A2+{h}). 
Theorem 20 (Countable representation). Consider any choice function C on L(XN×R).
Then C is coherent and exchangeable if and only if there is a coherent representing choice
function C̃ on V(ΣX ×R) such that, for every n in N, theX n-marginal Cn of C is determined
by
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)). (15)
In that case, C̃ is uniquely determined via its corresponding rejection function R̃ by R̃(Ã) ∶=
⋃n∈N R̃n(Ã∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) for all Ã inQ(V(ΣX ×R)), with R̃n(Mn(A)) ∶=Mn(Rn(A)) for
every A in Q(L(X n ×R)), and where we let R̃n(∅) ∶= ∅ for notational convenience. We
call C̃ the frequency representation of C.
Similarly, consider any set of desirable gambles D ⊆ L(XN×R). Then D is coherent
and exchangeable if and only if there is a unique representing D̃ ⊆ V(ΣX ×R) such that,
for every n in N, the X n-marginal Dn is given by Dn =⋃M̃−1n (D̃ ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)). In that
case, D̃ is given by D̃ =⋃n∈NMn(Dn).
Proof. We begin with the representation of choice functions. That C is exchangeable is, by
Proposition 18, equivalent to Cn is exchangeable, for every n in N. Therefore, by Theorem 12
this is equivalent to:
(∀n ∈N)Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)),
where, as a consequence, for every n in N, C̃n is uniquely given by
C̃n(Mn(A)) =Mn(Cn(A)) for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
That C is coherent, is by Propositions 15 and 16 equivalent to Cn is coherent, for every n in
N, and using Theorem 12, to C̃n is coherent, for every n in N. We prove that this is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of some coherent choice function C̃ on V(ΣX ×R) that, for
every n in N, satisfies Equation (15).
We start by showing the converse implication (sufficiency). Assume that there is some
coherent choice function C̃ on V(ΣX ×R) that for every n in N satisfies Equation (15).
Consider any n in N. By Proposition 19, then the choice function C̃n on Vn(ΣX ×R),
determined by C̃n(Ãn) = C̃(Ãn) for every Ãn in Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)), is coherent. Furthermore,
by Equation (15), it satisfies indeed
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
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Since C̃n(Ãn) = C̃(Ãn) for every Ãn in Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)), we find that also
R̃(Ãn) = R̃n(Ãn) for all Ãn in Q(Vn(ΣX ×R)). (16)
Next, we show that then R̃(Ã) =⋃n∈N R̃n(Ã∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) for all Ã in Q(V(ΣX ×R)),
thus making it unique. Consider any Ã in Q(V(ΣX ×R)). Then, by the definition of





(ΣX ×R) and therefore R̃(Ã) = R̃(Ã∩Vn
∗
(ΣX ×R)). By Equation (16) there-
fore R̃(Ã) = R̃n∗(Ã ∩Vn
∗
(ΣX ×R)), whence indeed R̃(Ã) ⊆ ⋃n∈N R̃n(Ã ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)).
Conversely, consider any h in ⋃n∈N R̃n(Ã∩Vn(ΣX ×R)). Then h ∈ R̃n∗(Ã∩Vn
∗
(ΣX ×R))
for some n∗ in N, and therefore, by Equation (16), h ∈ R̃(Ã∩Vn
∗
(ΣX ×R)). By Axiom R3a,
therefore indeed h ∈ R̃(Ã).
We complete the proof by showing the direct implication (necessity). Assume that
(∀n ∈N)Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)),
and that C̃n is coherent for every n in N. Let the rejection function R̃ on V(ΣX ×R)
by determined by R̃(Ã) ∶= ⋃n∈N R̃n(Ã ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) for all Ã in Q(V(ΣX ×R)). The
proof is finished if we can show that it satisfies Equation (16) for every n in N, because,
if it does, Equation (15) is then satisfied, and furthermore, by Proposition 19 it is then
coherent. Consider any n∗ in N. We need to show that ⋃n∈N R̃n(Ãn∗ ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) =
R̃n∗(Ãn∗) for all Ãn∗ in Q(Vn
∗
(ΣX ×R)). Observe that Ãn∗ ∩Vn(ΣX ×R) = Ãn∗ for every
n ≥ n∗, whence by Lemma 21, ⋃n∈N R̃n(Ãn∗ ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) = ⋃n≤n∗ R̃n(Ãn∗ ∩Vn(ΣX ×
R)). Furthermore, since Ãn∗ ∩Vn1(ΣX ×R) ⊆ Ãn∗ ∩Vn2(ΣX ×R) whenever n1 ≤ n2, also
R̃n1(Ãn∗ ∩V
n1(ΣX ×R)) = R̃n2(Ãn∗ ∩V
n1(ΣX ×R)) ⊆ R̃n2(Ãn∗ ∩V
n2(ΣX ×R)), where the
first equality follows from Lemma 21, and the second one from Axiom R3a. This implies
that indeed ⋃n≤n∗ R̃n(Ãn∗ ∩Vn(ΣX ×R)) = R̃n∗(Ãn∗ ∩Vn
∗
(ΣX ×R)) = R̃n∗(Ãn∗).
The representation of sets of desirable gambles is a trivial extension to vector-valued
gambles of the proof given in Reference [4, Theorem 22]. 
Lemma 21. Consider any coherent choice function C on L(XN×R) and assume that, for
every n in N, its X n-marginal Cn is given by
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃n(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)), (17)




Proof. Since Mn1 is surjective, we can find An1 inQ(L(X
n1×R)) such that Mn1(An1)= Ãn1 .
We will show that R̃n1(Ãn1) = R̃n2(Ãn1).
To show that R̃n1(Ãn1) ⊆ R̃n2(Ãn1), consider any h in R̃n1(Ãn1), and let fn1 be an element
of An1 such that Mn1( fn1) = h. Then fn1 ∈ Rn1(An1) by Equation (17). If we denote the
cylindrical extension of An1 to X
n2 by An2—and the cylindrical extension of fn1 by fn2—,
then fn2 ∈Rn2(An2) because Rn1 and Rn2 are related through marginalisation. But Rn2(An2) =
{ f ∈ An2 ∶Mn2( f ) ∈ R̃n2(Mn2(An2))} by Equation (17), and by Lemma 22, Rn2(An2) = { f ∈
An2 ∶ Mn2( f ) ∈ R̃n2(Mn1(An1))}. Since fn2 ∈ Rn2(An2), indeed h = Mn1( fn1) = Mn2( fn2) ∈
R̃n2(Mn1(An1)) = R̃n2(Ãn1).
The proof that also R̃n2(Ãn1) ⊆ R̃n1(Ãn1) is completely similar [with the same notation,
h ∈ R̃n2(Ãn1) implies that fn1 ∈Rn2(An1) by Equation (17), which implies that fn1 ∈Rn1(An1)
because Rn1 and Rn2 are related through marginalisation, which in turn implies that h ∈
R̃n1(Ãn1)]. 
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Lemma 22 ([4, Lemma 27]). Consider any n1 ≤ n2 in N, and any gamble fn1 inL(X
n1 ×R).
Denote its cylindrical extension to X n2 by fn2 . Then Mn1( fn1) =Mn2( fn2).
5.4. Conditioning and countable representation. We use the same notation and ideas as
in Reference [6, Section 5.2] for desirability, and generalise it to choice models.
Suppose we have a coherent and exchangeable choice function C on L(XN×R) with
associated frequency representation C̃ on V(ΣX ×R). Suppose that we observe the values x̌
of the first ň variables, with associated count vector m̌ ∶= T (x̌). We have seen in Proposi-
tion 18 that, for every n in N, the X n-marginal Cn is exchangeable, and in Proposition 8 that
Cn⌋m̌ is exchangeable (if n > m̌). But what about C⌋m̌?
Theorem 23. Consider any coherent and exchangeable choice function C on L(XN×R)
with associated frequency representation C̃ on V(ΣX ×R). After conditioning on a sample
with count vector m̌ in N ň, C⌋m̌ is still exchangeable and coherent, and has frequency
representation C̃⌋m̌, defined by
h ∈ C̃⌋m̌(Ã)⇔ Bm̌h ∈ C̃(Bm̌Ã), for every Ã in V(ΣX ×R) and h in Ã. (18)
Proof. Use Theorem 20 to infer that C̃ is coherent. We first show that C̃⌋m̌ is coherent. For
Axiom C1, consider any Ã in V(ΣX ×R). Since C̃(Bm̌Ã) ≠∅, indeed also C̃⌋m̌(Ã) ≠∅.
For Axiom C2, consider any h1 and h2 in V(ΣX ×R) such that h1 ≺B h2—meaning
h1 ⪯B h2 and h1 ≠ h2. Then h1(⋅,r)−h2(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶ m ∈N n,n ∈ N}) for some r in
R. Let R′ ∶= {r ∈ R ∶ h2(⋅,r)− h1(⋅,r) ≠ 0} ⊆ R be the non-empty set of rewards for
which h2(⋅,r)−h1(⋅,r) belongs to posi({Bm ∶m ∈N n,n ∈N}). Consider any r inR′. Then
h1(⋅,r)− h2(⋅,r) =∑`i=1 λiBmi for some ` in N, λ1, . . . , λ` in R>0, n1, . . . , n` in N and
m1 ∈ N n1 , . . . , m` ∈ N n` , and therefore (h1(⋅,r)− h2(⋅,r))Bm̌ = ∑`i=1 λiBmiBm̌. Use the































so Bm̌h1(⋅,r)−Bm̌h2(⋅,r) ∈ posi({Bm ∶ m ∈N n,n ∈ N}). Since the choice of r in R′ was
arbitrary, and since 0 = h1(⋅,r)−h2(⋅,r) = Bm̌h1(⋅,r)−Bm̌h2(⋅,r) for al r in R∖R′, we
have Bm̌h1 ≺B Bm̌h2, so Bm̌h1 ∉ C̃({Bm̌h1,Bm̌h2}) and therefore indeed h1 ∉ C̃⌋m̌({h1,h2}).
For Axiom C3a, consider any Ã, Ã1 and Ã2 inQ(V(ΣX ×R)) such that C̃⌋m̌(Ã2) ⊆ Ã2∖
Ã1 and Ã1 ⊆ Ã2 ⊆ Ã. Then C̃(Bm̌Ã2) ⊆Bm̌(Ã2∖ Ã1) =Bm̌Ã2∖Bm̌Ã1 and Bm̌Ã1 ⊆Bm̌Ã2 ⊆Bm̌Ã,
and therefore, by coherence, C̃(Bm̌Ã) ⊆ Bm̌Ã∖Bm̌Ã1. But then indeed C̃⌋m̌(Ã) ⊆ Ã∖ Ã1.
For Axiom C3b, consider any Ã, Ã1 and Ã2 in Q(V(ΣX ×R)) such that C⌋m̌(Ã2) ⊆
Ã2 ∖ Ã1 and Ã ⊆ Ã1. Then C(Bm̌Ã2) ⊆ Bm̌(Ã2 ∖ Ã1) = Bm̌Ã2 ∖Bm̌Ã1 and Bm̌Ã ⊆ Bm̌Ã1, and
therefore, C(Bm̌(Ã2∖ Ã)) =C(Bm̌Ã2∖Bm̌Ã) ⊆Bm̌Ã2∖Bm̌Ã1 =Bm̌(Ã2∖ Ã1). But then indeed
C⌋m̌(Ã2∖ Ã) ⊆ Ã2∖ Ã1.
For Axiom C4a, consider any Ã1 and Ã2 in Q(V(ΣX ×R)) and any λ in R>0 for which
Ã1 ⊆C⌋m̌(Ã2). Then Bm̌Ã1 ⊆C(Bm̌Ã2), and therefore, Bm̌λ Ã1 ⊆C(Bm̌λ Ã2). But then indeed
λ Ã1 ⊆C⌋m̌(λ Ã2).
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For Axiom C4b, consider any Ã1 and Ã2 in Q(V(ΣX ×R)) and any h in V(ΣX ×R)
for which Ã1 ⊆C⌋m̌(Ã2). Then Bm̌Ã1 ⊆C(Bm̌Ã2), and therefore, Bm̌(Ã1 +{h}) = Bm̌Ã1 +
{Bm̌h} ⊆C(Bm̌Ã2+{Bm̌h}) =C(Bm̌(Ã2+{h})). But then indeed Ã1+{h} ⊆C⌋m̌(Ã2+{h}).
To finish the proof, it suffices to show that C̃⌋m̌ is the frequency representation of C⌋m̌.
To establish this, we will show that, for every n in N such that n > ň, the X n-marginal Cn⌋m̌
of C conditional on m̌, is given by
Cn⌋m̌(Â) = { f ∈ Â ∶Mn̂( f ) ∈ C̃⌋m̌(Mn̂(Â))} for all Â in Q(L(X n̂×R)),
where n̂ ∶= n− ň > 1.
Consider any n in N such that n > ň. Since C is exchangeable, by Theorem 20, we get
Cn(A) = { f ∈ A ∶Mn( f ) ∈ C̃(Mn(A))} for all A in Q(L(X n×R)).
Therefore
Cn⌋m̌(Â) = { f ∈ Â ∶Mn(I[m̌] f ) ∈ C̃(Mn(I[m̌]Â))} for all Â in Q(L(X n̂×R)).
By Lemma 14, we have that then
Cn⌋m̌(Â) = { f ∈ Â ∶ Bm̌Mn̂( f ) ∈ C̃(Bm̌Mn̂(Â))} for all Â in Q(L(X n̂×R)),
and by Equation (18), therefore indeed
Cn⌋m̌(Â) = { f ∈ Â ∶Mn̂( f ) ∈ C̃⌋m̌(Mn̂(Â))} for all Â in Q(L(X n̂×R)). 
6. CONCLUSION
We have studied exchangeability and we have found counterparts to de Finetti’s finite
and countable representation results, in the general setting of choice functions. We have
shown that an exchangeability assessment is a particular indifference assessment, where
we identified the set of indifferent options. The main idea that made (finite) representation
possible is the linear order isomorphism H̃−1n between the quotient space and the set of
gambles on count vectors, indicating that (finitely) exchangeable choice functions can be
represented by a choice function that essentially represents preferences between gambles
on the unknown composition m of an urn with n balls of types X . Alternatively, for the
countable case, we have shown that there is a polynomial representation.
In their treatment of exchangeability for lower previsions [7], and for sets of desirable
gambles [6], the authors investigated exchangeability as a structural assessment. They
found an expression for the least informative coherent belief model—be it a coherent lower
previsions or a coherent set of desirable gambles—that is exchangeable and that extends
some direct assessments. They called this least informative extension under exchangeability
the exchangeable natural extension. It is an important line of future research to find such an
extension for choice functions. We have clear ideas on how to find expressions for it, and
intend to report on this elsewhere.
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